A story of Labour's haphazard decolonial policy in the 1960s
I was digging around in my room (a resting place for Lots of Stuff) this weekend when I came across some brilliant wall art and posters tucked in a corner.
Among them was my brother’s print of Che Guevera, my dad’s English Heritage Stonehenge poster, and an intriguing map of Mauritius (above), only produced in 2008.
The poster features the Outer Islands of Mauritius: Rodrigues, Agalega, Saint Brandon and Diego Garcia. This piqued my interest because each island was accompanied by a Mauritian flag – maybe suggesting their sovereignty should rest with Mauritius. It’s a contentious issue, as Diego Garcia (an atoll within the Chagos archipelago) has been the subject of a prickly political dispute between the UK/the US and Mauritius for decades. In the last couple of years, the International Court of Justice has become involved too.
Just this month, mass rallies following the Wakashio Oil Spill on Mauritius’ south coast prompted (questionable) rumours that protest leaders were being influenced by the U.S. to depose Mauritius’ Prime Minister, Pravind Jugnauth, who has publicly expressed his indignation towards Britain’s continued possession of Chagos.
It’s a convoluted suggestion, but still, these rumours sharply demonstrate the lasting ability of the Chagos affair to cause a stir.
Even back in '75, one resident of Cornwall was moved to write to his MP about the Diego Garcia agreements, wishing to...
"...register my objections to the whole affair for all the usual reasons - high-handed diplomacy, despoiling areas of natural beauty, disregarding of local opinion..."
So how did this story unfold? And who, or what, was at the heart of it?
Harold Wilson is a puzzling figure with a confused reputation.
Many recent accounts describe his successful 'management' of decolonisation, but my research has painted a picture. Wilson’s personal values and political principles were perhaps more influenced by an imperialist outlook - fundamental to the all-important Anglo-American relationship too.
It was the parameters of this relationship which led to Britain’s creation of the ‘British Indian Ocean Territory’ (BIOT) crown colony in 1965, an especially conspicuous move amidst the global wave of decolonisation in the '50s and '60s.
You wouldn't be the first if you think this view of the affair reflects a 21st century, 'presentist' interpretation of Wilson’s foreign and defence policy. But, you’d be disregarding the strong presence of anti-colonial voices during Wilson’s time in office.
Although Wilson might not have encountered anti-imperialist viewpoints early in his life, the opposite was true by the time he became Prime Minister in 1964. In fact, the Labour party's campaign leading up to his electoral win was marked by its “stronger line… on racial issues and self-determination for the native populations of former colonies”[1].
It’s important to note public consensus (especially from the Left) during this period of decolonisation. Scholars have noted the political expectation from 1965 for the “liquidation” of Britain's colonial empire, and the development of policy which was "more acceptable to international opinion".
Arguably, this task was a bit difficult for Wilson; his popularity at the time rested on his profile as a “quintessentially British figure”, a result of his sentimental attachment to “the dominions” and “belief in [Britain’s] national greatness”[2].
A clear paradox came from Wilson’s position as leader of the parliamentary Left, whose expectations of a “new, radical, political dawn … not least in foreign policy”[3] clashed with his personal commitments to the British Empire, and placation of the Right (for more on this see Ben Pimlott's 1992 analysis of Wilson's White Heat speech)[4].
This political pragmatism caused criticism from the Labour Party, especially with regards to his foreign and defence policy[5]. Wilson’s “conservative”[6] exercise of politics was perhaps reflected in his decision to “appoint colleagues from the right of the party to the key posts of Foreign Minister and Defence Minister”, e.g. Denis Healey for the latter in 1964[7]. Tensions also arose from Wilson's firm commitment to the Anglo-American relationship, as well as dependence on the US for financial support[8].
It's possible that Wilson’s imperial nostalgia informed his foreign and defence policy, as illustrated in the Chagos affair. As one author suggests,
his “conceptual baggage belonged, on relations with the United States in the 1940s, and, on the Commonwealth, with Labour Party hopes of the 1950s"[9].
Altogether, the Chagos affair provides a key example of how Wilson’s dedication to the ‘Special Relationship’ overlapped with his management of Labour Party hopes for self-determination within the Commonwealth.
The historical record reflects this conflict: Wilson paid “lip service” towards reducing defence commitments, but signalled his incapacity to “withdraw from the Far East” to Cabinet colleagues, precisely because of the Anglo-American relationship[10].
Anthony Seldon sums it up pretty well: post-war British defence policy is usually eclipsed by the foreign policy demands of the US [12].
This is important, because during the 1960s (in the lead up to Healey's 1966 Defence Review), US policymakers linked their financial support for Britain to the condition of Britain’s continued global defence role[13].
US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara "was particularly hawkish over Britain's not pulling out", reminding Roy Jenkins in 1965 that...
"Britain has an inescapable commitment in the Indian Ocean and Far East for at least the next ten years"[14].
McNamara’s statement becomes even more interesting once you know that...
..."formal diplomatic negotiations between… McNamara and British Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft began in 1962" to secure the US’ possession of Diego Garcia - the largest island in the BIOT which was formerly Mauritian territory[15].
Britain’s creation of the BIOT crown colony is a useful way to understand Wilson’s foreign/defence and decolonial policy. Crucially, Anthony Greenwood (1964 Secretary of State for the Colonies) justified the creation of the BIOT as a means to "make the withdrawal from Aden more palatable, especially to the Americans"[16]. So, the Chagos affair helps to illuminate the context of Wilson's commitment to US ties (especially within the environment of Cold War realpolitik).
Another example of such realpolitik: Wilson’s administration offered Mauritius independence on the condition that it “gave up Chagos” during negotiations in 1965[17].
Wilson acknowledged that his government would “pay a price” at the UN for the exchange[18], probably referring to the UN’s 1960 Declaration, which explicitly denounces any granting of independence that is "aimed at the partial or total disruption of the … territorial integrity of a country”[19].
But, Geoffrey Robertson QC suggests this "was a price [Wilson] was perfectly prepared to pay", an instance where "international law was overridden by the exigencies of the Cold War"[20]. He argues that Wilson "was, of course, seeking a national kick-back"[21], and...
...a 1966 secret note from Foreign Secretary George Brown confirms the UK would assume "the costs of the administrative detachment" of Chagos, provided the US would "forego the R&D surcharge" of the POLARIS missile system[22].
This (formerly secret) archival note shows that Wilson overlooked Labour’s manifesto pledges for “ending Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent”[23], interestingly, as US Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained that “[t]he nuclear deterrent is the most important of the great power symbols still in British possession”[24]. And so...
Still, we should remember that responsibility for the repercussions of the BIOT’s creation do not fall entirely to Harold Wilson. Denis Healey once stated that Wilson “rarely looked more than a few months ahead”[27], a charge which can be levelled at his management of Mauritius’ decolonisation and creation of the BIOT. Other recently published archives also highlight the breadth of the affair across Prime Ministers and administrations.
For example, Peter Carter (UK High Commissioner to Mauritius from 1970 to 1973) clarified that the question of resettlement for the Ilois (indigenous first generation inhabitants of the Chagos archipelago) in Mauritius had not been discussed at the Prime Minister's level "since 1965"[28].
Safe to say, Wilson probably didn't consider how his colleagues’ poor management of inhabitants’ expulsion would later be deemed illegal by the British High Court[29]. One infamous example is how Commissioner of the BIOT Bruce Greatbatch ordered the execution of pet dogs on Diego Garcia by gassing them. The local populatation saw this as a warning[30], and were forced to accept their relocation to neighbouring Mauritius.
Wilson might not have directly overseen such details, but his participation in an exercise where "the size and nature of the Ilois were deliberately manipulated and concealed... in order to avoid scrutiny by the United Nations"[31] leaves “no doubt that the cover-up was approved by the prime minister and at least three cabinet ministers”[32].
And in his approval of the exercise, Wilson helped to establish an unscrupulous background which led to such controversial techniques of removal and relocation.
Backbenchers (MPs in the outer circle) and even certain members of Wilson's cabinet were disdainful of his foreign policy at the time.
By 1966, the US Secretary to the Treasury noted that a failure to reduce defence spending East of Suez would lead to problems for Wilson, as he was being “accused of making his unemployed pay for a neo-colonial policy, under pressure from Washington”[33].
The 1966 Defence White Paper confirmed cuts to the defence budget, but President Johnson’s view of withdrawal East of Suez as “unwise, provocative, and absolutely unacceptable”[34] was perhaps reflected in the policy’s limited scope, leading to its condemnation by many in the Labour party “who had hoped for a more far-reaching review that got rid of Britain’s residual imperial role”[35].
Wilson’s appointment of “left-winger Barbara Castle” as the first Minister for Overseas Development[36] was supposed to be a gesture to such party members, but his pragmatism in selecting Denis Healey for Minister for Defence was equally as salient.
In his memoirs, Wilson[37] explained this choice was based on Healey’s "absolute certainty that he was right and everybody else was wrong...through malice".
This political shrewdness was arguably manifest in the Chagos affair, as Healey would have played a large role in its orchestration. This adds an interesting dimension to fraught cabinet tensions between Healey and Tony Benn[38], who was staunchly opposed to Wilson’s foreign policy.
"Denis would sit there and Tony would go on and Denis's view was a little bit like that of Enoch [Powell], that the logic was good but the conclusions were balls. Denis would say "and now here comes the bullshit"[38].
At the time, Benn asserted in his diary that Wilson could expect “trumpets” for his US visit in May 1967:
“...appropriate for a weak foreign head of state who has to be buttered up so that he can carry the can for American foreign policy"[39].
Wilson’s biographer Ben Pimlott explains that “in crude, geopolitical terms, there was a sense [that] Britain’s world role had become a mercenary one, as the United States’ hired help”[40]. Housing Minister Richard Crossman also “complained that Wilson had delusions of grandeur” in regards to Britain’s haphazard withdrawal from East of Suez[41].
Overall, Wilson saw his ‘management’ role as Britain's head of state as an ability to “maintain and use [the African continent]”[42], which he emphatically pointed out to the US. Paradoxically, he believed that his relationship with the US was not formed "on the basis of our past grandeur", nor "the nostalgia of our imperial age"[43].
Academic Peter Harris nonetheless illustrates how "the collusion to establish a US base on Diego Garcia" is a key example of the transfer of global preponderance from the UK to the US[44]. Altogether then, it’s clear that Wilson’s loyal creation of the BIOT reflects certain hawkish dimensions of the Anglo-American relationshion - which endure to this day[45].
NB all emboldened quotes are my own formatting.
NOTES
[1] Pimlott 1992, p.367 [2] Pimlott 1994, p.31 [3] Vickers 2016, p.261 [4] Pimlott 1992, pp. 304-305 [5] Vickers 2016, p.262 [6] Walker 1987, p.188 [7] Vickers 2016, p.261 [8] Colman 2004, p.111 [9] Walker 1987, p.207 [10] Vickers 2016, p.265
[11] Ashton and Louis 2004 p.xxxi [12] Seldon 1996 p.288 [13] Colman 2004 [14] Ashton and Louis 2004, p.xxxiv [15] Lutz 2009, p.186 [16] Harris 2013, p.721 [17] Vine 2006, p.160
[18] Vine 2006, p.160 [19] ibid [20] Robertson 2012 p.14 [21] ibid [22] TNA FCO 141/1354 [23] Vickers 2016, p.268 [24] ibid [25] Robertson 2012, p.14 [26] Seldon 1996 p.287 [27] Healey 1990, p.331
[28] TNA FCO 141/1355 [29] Curtis 2004, p.414 [30] Robertson 2012, p.19; Pilger 2004, para.8 [31] Gifford and Dunne 2014 p.1 [32] Pilger 2004, para.7 [33] Colman 2004, p.114 [34] ibid p.138 [35] Vickers 2016, p.270 [36] ibid p.273 [37] Wilson 1986, p.205
[38] Richards and Smith 2004, p.793 [39] Colman 2004, p.139 [40] Pimlott 1992 p.388 [41] Colman 2004, p.111 [42] Wilson 1971, p.48 [43] ibid p.50 [44] Harris 2013 p.720 [45] ibid p.723
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